Pages 2 and 3

Some comments on the bottom of 2 and top of 3:
I think Plantinga wrongly conflates reasons for thinking God does not exist with arguments against the rationality of theistic belief. Just because I show one's belief to be irrational, I am not entitled to conclude the belief is mistaken. Suppose a hermit with no exposure to the outside world believes George Bush is president based on astrology. Now clearly his belief is irrational even though the belief happens to be true – George Bush is president. So consider (1): showing that the arguments for God's existence do not work or make more reasonable belief in God. Let's say one shows that the present arguments for God's existence fail and thus theists don't have good reasons for believing that God exists, making belief in God irrational. He is then not entitled to infer that God does not exist. He has only shown that the reasons given don't support the conclusion. Such was the case in the George Bush argument; we weren't entitled to infer George Bush is not president. In other words, if your focus is (1) then you only have justification to suspend judgment. This is why most atheists are as irrational as theists since they can't offer good arguments for thinking God does not exist. And this is precisely what is required to be a rational atheist. One must accomplish (2): give good arguments for thinking God does not exist. Until one can accomplish (2) the only permissible stance is agnosticism. But Plantinga conflates one and two. He seems to suggest if you have done one, you have done the other. But the atheist must accomplish one and two, not just one or the other.
Some atheists would object to the above because they believe the default rational position is atheism just as the default rational position is to believe unicorns don't exist. The burden of proof, they say, is on the theist. But I think this is mistaken as does Plantinga in one of his articles.
A second problem with pgs. 2 and 3: even if a philosopher shows that the belief that P is irrational, it does not follow that before your were irrational, nor does it follow that you are presently irrational in believing P. For instance, imagine we are investigating a murder and all evidence points to John. He has a motive, he was last seen with the victim shouting that he would kill him, his fingerprints are all over the murder weapon, his DNA is all over the place and his blood is on the victim. Finally, he was found hovering over the victim with the knife in his hand. At this point we would be rational in believing that most likely John killed the victim. But suppose later we come upon very good evidence that he was set up. Then our belief that John did it would no longer be rational; but it was rational before. Consequently, I doubt an atheist can show that the best Christian philosophers have always irrationally believed that God exists. Having a rational belief does not guarantee that the belief is true. Rather, it makes it more likely that the belief is true. Case in point: the above murder scenario. Scientists and mathematicians have held many rational beliefs which turned out to be false in the end because of some new unforeseen discovery. Secondly, if an atheist shows that there aren't good reasons for thinking God exists, it does not follow that every person's theistic belief is irrational. Suppose John lives in the middle ages and is the prized pupil of Thomas Aquinas. He specializes in arguments for and against God's existence. But the more nuanced present day arguments against God's existence never occur to him despite his constant mental exertion on this topic. Clearly, relative to the evidence he has and given his continued search for evidence, he is justified in his belief that God exists.